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BOOK REVIEW
FREEDOM AND PROTECTION: TiE BurL OF RIGHTS. By Andrew D. Wein-
berger. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. ix, 180.
$1.75.
Any book that educates the American community to an under-
standing of and an appreciation for the Bill of Rights serves a lauda-
ble end. And conceivably any author is entitled to define his own
terms. However, Mr. Weinberger indicates his displeasure with the
traditional meaning of the term, "Bill of Rights," as embracing the
first ten amendments and sets out to include within his comparable
term what he calls "Additional Amendments Dealing with Personal
Liberty"' thus adding the 13th, 14th, 15th and 19th amendments, as
well as "Provisions in the Original Constitution Dealing with Personal
Liberty" which he specifies as the article I ban upon bills of attainder
and ex post facto laws, and the same article's provision that the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not ordinarily be sus-
pended; the article III requirement of jury trials and its definition of
Treason; the article IV privileges and immunities clause; and the
article VI ban upon religious test oaths. Since the author feels these
constitute the real Bill of Rights, a reader might well question the
inclusion of the fourth article's privileges and immunities clause, never
intended or applied to protect the fundamental liberties of man.
Furthermore, a reviewer is concerned not only with what the author
is adding to the accepted meaning of the term, "Bill of Rights,"
but the orthodox content that he deems unimportant. It is rather
amazing to find a person with the author's competence and sympathies
remarking that the seventh amendment's right of jury trial in civil
cases is "seemingly of no concern today."2 To the profession and to
our citizenry this right is fully as important today as when included in
the Bill of Rights.
As one notes the Table of Contents, it becomes apparent the author
must have some uncertainty about his own definition of "Bill of
Rights," since there is nothing in the book remotely concerned with
the thirteenth amendment, the fifteenth amendment, the nineteenth
amendment, the bans upon bills of attainder and ex post facto laws,
the definition of treason, the ban upon religious test oaths, or the
privileges and immunities of the fourth article. If these are truly part
of the Bill of Rights as the author claims, the book is rather deceptive
in its sub-title, "The Bill of Rights."
1. WEINBERGER, FREEoM AND PROTECTION 154 (1962).
2. WEINBERGER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 4.
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Within the various chapters the author has ordinarily blended well
written text with representative cases. However, to use as representa-
tive of "Religious Liberty" but two cases, McCollum3 and Everson4-
both establishment of religion cases, manifests an unfortunate pro-
jection of personal values at the expense of a reader legitimately
eager to read of religious liberty. Generally, the brief selections from
the cases are carefully edited, but employing in a total of twenty-six
cases, nine dissenting opinions and one concurring opinion raises
difficulties for the type of lay reader for whom the book was obviously
intended. In a few instances the majority opinion is similarly included
and the contrast in values and judicial methodologies is perceivable to
such a reader. Admitting, of course, that the dissenting opinion has
been a most important seed in the harvest of American constitutional
law, it is not always the best vehicle for indicating the factual setting
in which the litigation arose or narrating the precedents relied upon
by the members of the Court who prevailed, both of which would be
necessary to the non-professional reader anxious to judge the merits of
the two positions.
Although the author's style is interesting and the text moving, there
are, unfortunately, some instances in which the reader might be
misinformed. Thus, although the "separate but equal" test did not
begin to meet its demise until the Brown case5 in 1954, the author
states that, "After the Civil War, during the Reconstruction Period,
the Court repeatedly held that state-imposed racial segregation was
discrimination per se and accordingly a violation of the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth."6 Again, presumably speaking of
constitutional law under the Bill of Rights, the author remarks: "The
Quakers and other well-established sects have been upheld in their
right to their religious convictions (refusal to bear arms) ."7 Surely
the author understands that any exemption from military service to
the Quakers "and other well-established sects" is based only at this
writing upon congressional favor and not the United States Constitu-
tion. Once more, speaking of the sixth amendment's right of the
accused to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, to be in-
formed of the accusations, to be confronted by the government's
witnesses and to call his own witnesses, and to have the assistance of
counsel, and the seventh amendments right to jury trial in civil cases,
Mr. Weinberger asserts: "Each of these provisions is binding on
trials in the State courts as well as the Federal courts, but the States
are free to determine what cases are to be tried without juries in their
3. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
4. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
5. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. WE rB)GE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 17.
7. Wamrr- aER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 22.
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courts."8 Of course, there is no case holding the right to a speedy trial
is binding upon the states, no decision recognizing the right of con-
frontation under the fourteenth, and, worst of all, the right to counsel
in state courts under present Betts v. Brady9 doctrine is limited to the
exceptional case where to deny counsel would be in effect denying
the defendant a fair trial. Once again, the lay reader who perceives
from the author that the fifth amendment is available in "any case,
civil or criminal"'0 would probably surmise it is available in state
proceedings, which conclusion is certainly not supported by present
authority.
Throughout the work, it must be said, there is an unfortunate in-
clination to speak in generalities that do not adequately capture the
decision cited. For example, in referring to Speiser v. Randall" and
First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles,12 the author indicates to
the reader that, "ideas are not to be controlled by granting or
withholding tax exemption."' 3 As admirable as is Mr. Weinberg-
er's philosophy, the cases simply do not stand for such a bald
proposition. Understandably, in writing law for an audience untrained
in the law, there may be an urge to avoid the "technical," but the
obligation of clarity and accuracy remains great. Perhaps, there is a
lack of understanding by the author of the facts of some of the princi-
pal cases he discusses. For example, he treats Niemotko v. Maryland4
and states that "the Court invalidated the ordinance."15 A careful
reading of the record will disclose there was no ordinance involved in
the case whatsoever. But, principally, as suggested above, it is the
author's willingness to indulge in rather superficial and disturbing
generalizations that is the most serious fault of the work. Thus,
citing the Thornhill case,16 he tells the reader: "At one time it was
held that picketing was an absolute right .... ."17 Certainly, the Su-
preme Court never held this to be absolute any more than it has so
ruled other of the first amendment freedoms. And there is a certain
naivete in a too literal reading of case law. For example, from the
later picketing cases, Mr. Weinberger states: "And when picketing
for the purpose of communicating social protest seeks an objective
subversive of established State policy, it too may be enjoined." 8 Some
8. Id. at 41.
9. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
10. WENBERGEaR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 47.
11. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
12. 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
13. WEINBEaGEa, op. cit. supra note 1, at 103.
14. 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
15. WEINBERGR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 116.
16. Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).




reader might perhaps ask if a state, by announcing a policy against
improving working conditions, could successfully ban picketing for
such an objective. The author might well have explored with his
audience conditions under which the Supreme Court will defer to
state policy in this area.
Inter alia, the Appendix includes the Declaration of Independence
which admittedly deserves to be brought to the attention of the
American people rather regularly, but it seems only remotely part of
a treatment of "The Bill of Rights."
This little book of less than 200 pages may serve as an introduction
to the fundamental freedoms and our basic procedural safeguards.
Although the author obviously treasures these values and is properly
critical of the decisions of the past twenty years which have unneces-
sarily denied freedom in the name of protection, his somewhat care-
less treatment of the facts in the cases he has chosen, his misinterpre-
tation of some of the leading cases, and a too frequent indulgence
in generalizations not supported by decision, all may unfortunately
deter the layman's interest in and dedication to the values which we
have attempted to perpetuate for our society in the Bill of Rights.
Chester J. Antieau*
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law School.
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